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Introduction – The Dream of Universality
Since time immemorial humankind has sought to create a regulatory
framework that could mitigate the destruction of war.2 Ignatieff notes the
ubiquity of military codes in all cultures and that “their common features
are among the oldest artefacts of human morality”’3 but the local diversity
of such norms prevented the establishment of a generally applicable body
of rules. By the 19th century, however, the formation of standing armies,
permanently organised national military forces that were solely vested
with the sovereign monopoly of forces resulted in the progressive elimina-
tion of private modes of warfare and necessitated the development of a
universal system of law of war.4 Since 1868, states have concluded nume-
rous international agreements codifying the laws of armed conflict and
this field has become one of the most tightly regulated areas of internatio-
nal law.5 Moreover, many international lawyers emphasise that the very
character of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) has undergone a profound
transformation as signalled by the increasingly prevalent use of the ex-
1 This paper was written with the support of the Bolyai János Research Fellowship of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund
OTKA (PD 113010). I would like to thank the editors, Enikő Dácz, Henriett
Kovács and Christina Griessler for their — seemingly — endless patience in face of
my — actually — never-ending delays of submitting the manuscript.
2 Harding emphasises that such rules are “as old an institution as war itself”. Harding,
Ian: The Origins and Effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of
War Victims, in: International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 13, 1973, No. 147,
pp. 283‒290, here p. 285.
3 Ignatieff, Michael: The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience,
London: Chatto & Windus, 1998, pp. 116‒117.
4 Kennedy, David: War and International Law: Distinguishing Military and Humani-
tarian Professions, in: International Law Studies, Vol. 82, 2006, pp. 3‒36, here p. 7.
5 For a full list of all international agreements see https://www.icrc.org/ihl (last ac-
cessed: 15 December 2014).
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pression “international humanitarian law” (IHL), a term that in itself im-
plies universality and equal application to tame the horrors of armed con-
flict.6 In that vein, Meron explains that under the influence of human
rights “the law of war has been changing and acquiring a more humane
face: the inroads made on the dominant role of reciprocity; the fostering of
accountability; the formation, formulation and interpretation of rules
[…]”7
Such “humanized” humanitarian law seems to be the pinnacle of
progress, the fulfilment of the ancient dream of humanity. Still, this pris-
tine image is marred by a history of racism, exclusion, and lethal inclu-
sion. In this paper I would like to reflect on these blemishes and examine
whether international humanitarian law can move beyond its past and pre-
sent to finally truly deserve such a lofty label.
The Progress of Civilisation and Racism – Unity through Exclusion
In 1868, on the proposition of Imperial Russia, the major world powers re-
nounced for the first time in history in an international treaty the use of a
particular means of warfare, explosive projectiles under the weight of 400
grammes.8 The preamble of the St. Petersburg Declaration enunciated that
6 Solis underlines that “the conflation of LOAC/IHL terminology reflects a desire of
humanitarian-oriented groups and nongovernmental organisations to avoid phrases
like “law of war” in favour of more pacific terms, perhaps in the hope that battle-
field actions may someday follow that description.” Solis, Gary D.: The Law of
Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010, p. 22. However, the term “international humanitarian law”
is still not universally accepted as demonstrated by the US government’s consistent
use of the term “law of war” or “laws and customs of war” instead. See Bellinger,
III, John. B/Haynes, II, William J.: A US Government Response to the International
Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, in:
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, 2007, No. 866, pp. 443‒471, here
p. 473. Moreover, many scholars still use the traditional term. See e.g. Byers,
Michael: War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict, New
York: Grove Press, 2005; Detter, Ingrid: The Law of War, 3rd ed, London: Ashgate
Press, 2013.
7 Meron, Theodor: The Humanization of International Law, Leiden: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 2006, p. 1.
8 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, opened for signature 11 December 1868
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there is an “expediency of forbidding the use of certain projectiles in times
of war between civilised nations” and since “the only legitimate object
which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy” the employment of weapons which “useless-
ly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevita-
ble” should be prohibited. This pronouncement was couched in the general
telos of progress as “the progress of civilisation should have the effect of
alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war”.
Three decades later, the preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention (II)
asserted that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Con-
tracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain un-
der the protection and the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilised nations, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.9
This formulation, widely known as “Martens Clause”, named after the fa-
mous Russian jurist Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, who suggested the in-
clusion of a general reference to unwritten principles to resolve a diplo-
matic deadlock during the negotiations,10 was restated in the preamble of
the 1907 Hague Convention IV, which emphasised that it was paramount
to “serve, even in this extreme case, the interest of humanity and the ever
progressive needs of civilisation”,11 while a slightly modified version ap-
peared in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,12 and it
(entry into force 11 December 1868). Roberts, Adam/Guelff, Richards: Docu-
ments on the Laws of War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2002,
pp. 54‒55.
9 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened
for signature 29 July 1899 (entry into force 4 September 1900). https://www.icrc.o
rg/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=9FE084CD
AC63D10FC12563CD00515C4D (last accessed: 13 December 2014).
10 See more in detail Cassese, Antonio: The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply
Pie in the Sky? In: European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, 2000, No. 1,
pp.187‒216, here pp. 193‒198.
11 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for
signature 18 October 1907 (entry into force 26 January 1910). Roberts/Guelff:
Documents on the Laws of War, p. 69.
12 Art. 1 (2) declares that ”[I]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other interna-
tional agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and au-
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was incorporated into numerous other conventions regulating the means
and methods of warfare.13 In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opi-
nion) the International Court of Justice affirmed the relevance of the Mar-
tens Clause “whose continuing existence and applicability is not to be
doubted” and declared that “it has proved to be an effective means of ad-
dressing the rapid evolution of military technology”.14
Today the Martens Clause is generally regarded as a reminder that even
in the absence of black letter law the belligerents’ freedom to resort to vio-
lence in an armed conflict is constrained by customary law and general
considerations of humanity.15 One could draw the conclusion from such
references to progress, civilisation, and humanity that classical internatio-
nal law aimed at creating a universally applicable regulation of legitimate
conduct during armed conflicts. After all, references to these noble ideals
have predated the adoption of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration and we-
thority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signa-
ture 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 (entry into force 7 December 1979).
13 See inter alia, the reference to “the role of public conscience in furthering the prin-
ciples of humanity” in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ot-
tawa Convention), opened for signature 18 September 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S 2041
(entry into force 1 March 1999); or the affirmation that “the rules governing the
protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict should reflect devel-
opments in international law”, Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, opened for
signature 26 March 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212 (entry into force 9 March 2004).
14 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July
1996, I.C.J. Rep. 66, paras. 87. and 78. This reference was probably in part a reply
to the extreme position submitted by Russia stating that “today the ‘Martens
Clause’ may formally be considered inapplicable”. See Cassese: The Martens
Clause, p. 211.
15 There is copious literature on the significance of the Martens Clause in interna-
tional humanitarian law. See inter alia Ticehurst, Rupert: The Martens Clause and
the Laws of Armed Conflict, in: International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 37,
1997, No. 317, pp. 125-134.; Pustogarov, Vladimier Vasilievich: The Martens
Clause in International Law, in: Journal of the History of International Law, Vol.
1, 1999, No. 1, pp. 125‒135.; Meron, Theodor: The Martens Clause, Principles of
Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, in: American Journal of Internation-
al Law, Vol. 94, 2000, No. 1, pp. 78‒89.
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re used as justifications outside the scope of the law of war as well. The
Declaration against the Slave Trade, signed at the Congress of Vienna in
1815, had already echoed this universalistic sentiment declaring that slave
trade is “repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality
[...] the public voice, in all civilised countries, calls aloud for its prompt
suppression.”16
Notwithstanding the moral rhetoric and the frequent references to uni-
versal principles, the laws of nations were deemed to apply to “civilised”
nations only, to countries that shared a similar, predominantly Western
and Christian culture. Consequently, outside this scope international law
did not (or only to a limited extent) regulate the relationship between “ci-
vilised” and “uncivilised” countries.17 A passage from Mill perfectly sum-
marises this essentially racist justification of the differentiated application
of international law. He argued that:
To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of interna-
tional morality, can obtain between one civilised nation and another, and be-
tween civilised nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no
16 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, Act No. XV., Declaration of the Powers on
the Abolition of the Slave Trade, signed on 8 February 1815. http://
en.wikisource.org/wiki/Final_Act_of_the_Congress_of_Vienna/Act_XV (last ac-
cessed: 20 December 2014). However, Grewe emphasises that reference to
“mankind, humanity, civilisation, universal morals […] was the vocabulary of
English popular philosophy of the nineteenth century. It stood in stark contrast to
the vocabulary of Vienna […] to the evocation of the ”esprit de fraternité” of the
continental monarchs”. Grewe, Wilhelm W.: The Epochs of International Law,
Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 2000, pp. 554‒555. Similarly, Zagor points out that
“[T]he characterization of an international legal rule as reflecting what would later
in the Martens Clause be termed the ‘dictates of public conscience’ is as unique as
it is disingenuous. The world society whose normative voice can be heard in the
1815 Declaration was essentially that of Britain, the emerging hegemon after the
Napoleonic wars, where an organized and politicized public had demanded inter-
national action.” Zagor, Matthew: Elementary Considerations of Humanity, in:
Bannelier, Karine/Christakis, Theodore/Heathcote, Sarah (eds.): The ICJ and the
Evolution of International Law: The Enduring Impact of the ''Corfu Channel''
Case, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 264‒291, here p. 270.
17 On the standard of civilisation see Gong, Gerrit W.: The Standard of Civilization,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Alexandrowicz argues that before the 19th
century relations between European and non-European powers were more equal
and the emergence of positivistic jurisprudence caused a discernible shift. See
Alexandrowicz, Charles Henry: Doctrinal Aspects of the Universality of the Law
of Nations, in: British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 37, 1961, pp. 506‒515.
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statesman can fall into however it may be with those, who from a safe and
unresponsable position, criticise statesmen. Among the many reasons why the
same rules cannot be applicable to situations so different, the two following
are among the most important. In the first place, the rules of ordinary interna-
tional morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate. They
cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable
of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant
motives. In the next place, nations which are still barbarous have not got
beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they
should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners […] To characterise
any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of
nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject. A
violation of great principles of morality it may easily be, but barbarians have
no rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest
possible period, fit them for becoming one. The only moral laws for the relati-
on between a civilised and a barbarous government are the universal rules of
morality between man and man.18
For contemporary authors, the “non-civilised”, barbarous”, “savage” peo-
ple were biologically incapable of complying with the normative regu-
lation of international law. They could not be placed on an equal footing
with the European, civilised world but had to be controlled and civilised
— forcefully, if necessary. Inevitably, they did not possess sovereignty
unless to the limited extent that they had the right to transfer ownership of
their land to the colonising powers.19 As put pithily by Anghie: “[T]he ba-
18 Mill, John Stuart: A Few Words on Non-intervention, in: Mill, John Stuart: Dis-
sertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical, Boston:
William V. Spencer, 1867, Vol. 4, pp. 157‒182, here pp. 171‒172. A century ear-
lier Hume similarly contended that: “There was never a civilised nation of any
other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or
speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On
the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Ger-
mans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour,
form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant differ-
ence could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an
original distinction betwixt these breeds of men.” Hume, David: Of National Char-
acters, in: Hume, David: Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London: A.
Millar, 1760, Vol. 1, pp. 321‒348, here p. 337.
19 Lorimer for instance emphasised that the international lawyer “is not bound to ap-
ply the positive law of nations to savages, or even to barbarians, as such; but he is
bound to ascertain the points at which, and the directions in which, barbarians or
savages come within the scope of partial recognition.” Lorimer, James: The Insti-
tutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political
Communities, Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1883, Vol. I, p. 102.
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sic point is that the development of the idea of sovereignty in relation to
the non-European world occurs in terms of dispossession, its ability to
alienate its lands and rights […] the native is granted personality in order
to be bound”.20 This meant that such sovereignty was “only tenuously
connected with its own identity; rather, it was artificially created in accor-
dance with the interests and world view of Europe; it emerged from and
was inextricably linked with complex of practices which were explicitly
directed towards the exploitation and domination of non-European peop-
les”.21
To rationalize mission civilisatrice as a standard justification for coloniza-
tion,22 contemporary scholarship had to resort to biological and anthropologi-
cal arguments. Analysing the works of Cambridge law professor Thomas J.
Lawrence, Riles observes that texts are replete with references to the crude
biological nature of the “race of savages” and the “dwarfs of the Central Afri-
can forest,” for example. The thrill of the racialized savage – the thrill of ra-
cism – is the thrill of catagorizing, of ordering, of controlling; and Lawrence’s
use of this imagery in his treatise imputed this thrill to international law […]23
The savage was regarded subhuman and superhuman at the same time,
which warranted the non-application of the law of war. The savage was
subhuman since he was driven by his violent nature that resulted in a con-
stant state of war and all kinds of moral depravities. Lawrence thus argued
that:
20 Anghie, Anthony: Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 105.
21 Anghie: Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 104.
22 In the opening speech of the 1884‒85 Africa Conference for instance Prince Bis-
marck noted that “all the Governments invited share the wish to bring the natives
of Africa within the pale of civilization by opening up the interior of the continent
to commerce […]” See Anghie: Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of Inter-
national Law, p. 97. Orford insightfully remarks that “[T]he hero’s journey is
about civilisation, progress or development of that colonised subject. Intervention
by white men is justified in order first to civilise the natives of subject colonies,
and later, in the era of decolonisation, to assist the development of those former
colonies. The notion of progress continues to provide the imaginative framework
for intervention stories in the era of decolonisation.” See Orford, Anne: Reading
Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International
Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 171.
23 Riles, Annelise: Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Es-
sentialization of Culture, in: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 106, 1993, pp. 723‒740,
here p. 729.
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War between savage tribes is marked by the unrestricted indulgence of man’s
fiercest passions. Conquered enemies are enslaved, or tortured, or even eaten.
Whatever hatred suggests is done without stint or limit. The actual fighting is
carried on in the most ferocious and bloodthirsty manner, and when it is over
the vanquished are made to drain the cup of misery to the last bitter drop
[…]”24
At the same time, the savage apparently had a superhuman physical
strength and stamina so the usual restrictions of the law of war concerning
means and methods of warfare could not possibly affect colonial warfare.
In a revealing episode, Great Britain supported the ban of expanding
(dum-dum) bullets at the 1899 Hague Conference but made a case for an
exception in colonial conflicts. The British representative, Sir John Ard-
agh scornfully argued that:
In civilised war a soldier penetrated by a small projectile is wounded, with-
draws to the ambulance, and does not advance any further. It is very different
with a savage. Even though pierced two or three times, he does not cease to
march forward, does not call upon the hospital attendants, but continues on,
and before anyone has time to explain to him that he is flagrantly violating the
decision of the Hague Conference, he cuts off your head.25
While the British proposition was ultimately defeated, the underlying idea
that since the savages are incapable of showing restraint in warfare the law
of war cannot apply to them persisted.26 Indeed, according to a widely
held view the only humane course of action in such situations was the un-
24 Thomas J. Lawrence, The Evolution of Peace, in: Essays on Some Disputed Ques-
tions of International Law, Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co., 1884, pp. 214‒
252, here p. 236.
25 Scott, James B., The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1909, Vol. I., p. 343.
26 Moreover, since non-Western peoples were not accepted as civilised nations, they
could not participate in international legislation either. Among the signatories of
the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, there was only two non-Western states, Persia
and Turkey. At the 1899 Hague Peace Conference this paltry number only grew
marginally by the presence of Japan and Siam. Mégret aptly points out that “The
perversity of this whole situation is, of course, that the nonparticipation of ‘non-
civilized nations’ in humanitarian treaties was not their choice, but simply a conse-
quence of the fact that, since they were not considered sovereign (a quality from
which they were excluded by ‘civilized nations’), they could not possibly join
these treaties.” Mégret, Frédéric: From ’Savages’ to Unlawful Combatants: a Post-
colonial Look at International Humanitarian Law’s ’Other’, in: Orford, Anne (ed.):
International Law and Its Others, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006,
pp. 265‒317, here p. 285.
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restrained use of violence. Treitschke supported the excesses of the Ger-
man colonial warfare since “international law becomes phrases if its stan-
dards are also applied to barbaric peoples. To punish a Negro tribe, villa-
ges must be burned [...] If the German Reich in such cases applied interna-
tional law, it would not be humanity or justice but shameful weakness.”27
Similarly, Colby held that
[I]f a few “non-combatants” — if there be any such in native folk of this char-
acter — are killed, the loss of life is probably far less than might have been
sustained in prolonged operations of a more polite character. The inhuman act
thus becomes actually humane, for it shortens the conflict and prevents the
shedding of more excessive quantities of blood.28
According to this view, while the dictates of human decency and the re-
quirement of maintaining military discipline could still result in the en-
forcement of some rules of the law of armed conflict,29 ultimately it was
within the discretion of the military commanders to determine which
norms they wished to adhere to.30
The idea of Western superiority has lost all intellectual currency by the
end of World War II and Article 1 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations
explicitly prescribed “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
27 Lindovist, Sven: “Exterminate All the Brutes”: One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart
of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide, New York: New Press, 1992,
p. 157.
28 Colby, Eldridge: How to Fight Savage Tribes, in: American Journal of Internatio-
nal Law, Vol. 21, 1927, No. 2, pp. 279‒288, here p. 287. See however the article
of Wright arguing for a limited application of international law in such situations.
Wright, Quincy: The Bombardment of Damascus, in: American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, Vol. 20, 1926, No. 2, pp. 263‒280.
29 See Colby: How to Fight Savage Tribes, pp. 286‒287.
30 See also the directive issued by Royal Air Force Chief of the Air Staff, Hugh
Trenchard, on 1 March 1924 that highlighted that “[I]n warfare against savage
tribes who do not conform to codes of civilized warfare, air bombardment is not
necessarily limited in its methods or objectives by rules agreed upon in interna-
tional law.” See Trenchard, Hugh: Employment of Aircraft on the North-West
Frontier of India, Royal Air Force Directive issued on 1 March 1924, cited in
Chandler, Graham: The Bombing of Waziristan, in: Air and Space Magazine, July
2011, http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/the-bombing-of-waziristan-1
62104725/ (last accessed: 4 January 2015).
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language, or religion” as one of the purposes of the United Nations.31 The
savage may have no longer “provided the symbolic counterpoint to […]
[the] ordering functions of international law’32 but the universal applicati-
on of the law of armed conflict was still not accomplished.
Lack of Universality – The Distinction between International and Non-
International Armed Conflicts
The Regulation of Insurgency and Belligerency
Before the Second World War, international law focused on the regulation
of inter-state violence and consequently generally regarded civil wars as
falling into the domaine réservé of sovereign states. Classical international
law literature used a spate of different expressions to denote internal con-
flicts, inter alia riot, mob violence, insurrection, disturbances, rebellion,
commotion etc. The legal significance of this differing terminology, howe-
ver, seemed to be uncertain at best.33 The rules of the laws of armed con-
flict only became applicable when the state accorded recognition of insur-
gency or belligerency to the rebels, accepting them as equal belligerents.
The doctrine of belligerent recognition took shape in the early nineteenth
century through a practice arising from the conflict in the Spanish-Ameri-
can colonies. The first recognition of belligerency occurred in 1815 when
the United States granted belligerent rights to the South American states
still fighting for their independence against Spain and Great Britain follo-
wed suit in 1819.34
31 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 16
(entry into force 24 October 1945). Although the vestiges of the idea of distinction
between civilised and non-civilised nations remained in the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice with the reference to “general principles of law recognised
by civilised nations” as a source of international law in Art. 38 (1) (c). Statute of
the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 (entry into force 24 October 1945).
32 Riles: Aspiration and Control, p. 730.
33 For an excellent overview of the relevant English, French and German terminolo-
gy see Lombardi, Aldo Virgilio: Bürgerkrieg und Völkerrecht, Berlin: Dunckler &
Humblot, 1976, pp. 75‒85.
34 Moir, Lindsay: The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002, pp. 6‒7.
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The main difference between insurgency and belligerency was the
scope of corresponding rights. While insurgency was merely a provisional
classification, which would arise merely to settle problems arising from de
facto control of territory by rebels,35 recognition of belligerency created a
formal status involving rights and duties, since each of the parties had the
right to exercise belligerent rights such as search of ships on the high seas,
seizure of contraband and confiscation of ships running and effective blo-
ckade.36 Moreover, by recognising the rebels as belligerents, the govern-
ment was putting them “under an obligation to respect the customs of war
against its own forces, and at the same time freeing itself from any re-
sponsibility for acts committed by the recognised belligerents”.37 Even
though recognition of belligerency was claimed to be based on facts,38 the
distinction between insurgency and belligerency was still uncertain. Legal
opinion varied about the consequences of the recognition of insurgency
and about the necessity of the recognition of belligerency to bring about
the application of the full gamut of the laws of war.39
In theory, recognition of belligerency was obligatory in case the condi-
tions were fulfilled, however, in reality “the imprecision of the criteria left
35 Green defined insurgency as “a condition or status in which organized bodies of
men are in a state of armed hostility against the established government for public
political purposes. It is something more than mere riot. Insurgency status is at-
tained when the insurgent movement has become an actual threat to the continua-
tion of the established government and succeeded in interrupting normal foreign
intercourse between the legitimate government and foreign states.” See Green,
Fred K.: The Concept of ”War” and the Concept of “Combatant” in Modern Con-
flicts, in: Military Law and Law of War Review, Vol. 10, 1971, pp. 267‒309, here
p. 270.
36 Shaw, Malcolm N.: International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008, 6th ed., p. 149.
37 De la Haye, Eve: War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008, p. 35.
38 During the 1867 Cretan Insurrection British Law Officers stated that “[I]t is al-
ways a question of fact to be determined by the Government of the Neutral State,
whether the Insurrection has or has not assumed the dimensions of War, and
whether the legitimate interests of the Neutral State do or do not require that she
should claim from both parties to the performance towards her of the obligations
incident to the Status of a belligerent.” Quoted in Moir: The Law of Internal
Armed Conflict, pp. 14‒15.
39 For a masterful discussion of the issue see Wright, Quincy: The American Civil
War, in: Falk, Richard A. (ed.) The International Law of Civil War, Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 30‒110, here pp. 42‒54.
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the legal government discretion to decide whether or not to recognise the
existence of conflict.”40 At the end of the day, recognition of belligerency
was a decision largely based on policy considerations,41 such as the desire
to escape responsibility for the acts of the insurgents or, in the interests of
humanity, to avoid cruelties and reprisals42 and the perceived lack of ef-
fectiveness of insurgents was regularly invoked as a convenient justificati-
on for refusal to accord belligerent status.43
The Distinction between International and Non-International Armed
Conflicts
After 1945, due to the desuetude of the regime of recognition of bel-
ligerency and drawing on the horrors of the Spanish Civil War, the in-
evitability of the regulation of internal hostilities became evident. To re-
medy this gap in legal regulation, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Con-
ventions was adopted as a revolutionary new piece of international legisla-
tion.44 The Article represents an uneasy compromise between the humani-
tarians seeking to extend the full body of international humanitarian law to
internal conflicts and those attempting to preserve the sovereign rights of
states.45 It appears with identical text in all four of the Geneva Conventi-
40 Zorgbibe, Charles: Sources of the Recognition of Belligerent Status, in: Interna-
tional Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 17, 1977, No. 192, pp. 111‒127, here p. 113.
41 Wilson, Robert R.: Recognition of Insurgency and Belligerency, in: American So-
ciety of International Law Proceedings, Vol. 31, 1937, pp. 136‒144, here p. 138.
42 Wilson: Recognition of Insurgency and Belligerency, p. 139. See the Williams v.
Bruffy case, where the US Supreme Court explained that recognition of bel-
ligerency and concession of the exercise of belligerents’ rights by the insurgents
“is made in the interest of humanity, to prevent the cruelties which would in-
evitably follow mutual reprisals and retaliations.” Williams v. Bruffy (1877), 96
US 176, p. 186.
43 Accordingly, French president Stourm justified denying recognition of belligerent
status of the 1864 Polish insurrection by pointing out that the Polish forces did not
have a de facto government, did not control territory, and did not have responsible
command. See Zorgbibe: Sources of the Recognition of Belligerent Status, pp.
121‒122.
44 See Moir: The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, pp. 23‒29.
45 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Non-international Armed Conflicts’, in: Jiri Toman (ed.) In-
ternational Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, 1988, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, pp. 217-239, here pp. 218‒221.
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ons and constitutes a completely separate entity from the other provisions,
a ”Convention in miniature”.46
Even though its text contains only a series of rudimentary provisions
dealing with minimum rights and obligations in case of an “armed conflict
not of an international character”,47 it was hailed by the International
Court of Justice as the expression of “elementary considerations of huma-
nity”, which are applicable in all armed conflicts.48 However, the defini-
tion of “armed conflict not of an international character” is conspicuously
missing from the text.49
46 Pictet, Jean (ed.) Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 34.
47 Common Article 3 reads: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provi-
sions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sick-
ness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means
of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict.” See https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/375-590006 (last
accessed: 8 April 2015.).
48 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. Unit-
ed States), Merits, ICJ Reports, 1986, paragraph 218.
49 The ICRC Commentary finds this omission a positive attribute as it enables a
wider scope of application. Pictet (ed.): Convention (IV), p. 36. Draper, however,
notes that this leaves the provision “open to much ambiguity of interpretation. As
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A few years after the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Convention, Pictet
submitted that Common Article 3 should have an extremely wide scope of
application, extending it to virtually every single instance of violence by
appealing to humanitarian considerations.50 However, the travaux prépa-
ratoires reveal that during the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, most states
wished to set a very high threshold of application for Common Article 3.
The US delegation, for instance, emphasised that insurgents must possess
a state-like structure, similar to the classic conditions of recognition of
belligerency.51 Correspondingly, the Australian52 and Canadian53 delegati-
ons submitted similar proposals.54 It can be concluded that the drafters
conceived the term “armed conflict not of an international character” to re-
fer to “situations of civil war, i.e. non-international armed conflict re-
aching the threshold of intensity associated with contemporaneous con-
ventional international warfare.”55 In practice, states usually denied the
existence of a non-international armed conflict, even in exceptionally se-
rious internal conflicts, to avoid conferring a legitimate status to rebels.
During the 1954-1962 Algerian War of Independence, France never offici-
ally recognised that the “rebellion” had reached the threshold of an armed
conflict and treated the conflict as a law-enforcement situation56 even
is so often the case with humanitarian law instruments, this is the outcome of the
desire for maximum width for the play of the humanitarian norms, overriding the
desire for that element of certainty which legal norms demand if they are to be ef-
fective.” Dare Draper, Gerald Irving A.: Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed
Conflicts, in: Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 13,
1983, pp. 253‒257, here p. 264.
50 Pictet (ed.), Convention (IV), p. 36.
51 The US Head of Delegation, Leland Harrison, underlined that “the insurgents must
have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State”; must pos-
sess control over a defined territory and persons; rebel armed forces must have re-
sponsible command and comply with humanitarian law; and finally the insurgent
civil authority must expressly accept the obligations of the Conventions. Final
Record, Vol. II‒B, Summary Records, 2nd Meeting, p. 12.
52 Final Record, Vol. II-B, Summary Records, 2nd Meeting, p. 15.
53 Ibid., p. 13.
54 For a thorough perusal of the travaux préparatoires see Cullen, Anthony: The Con-
cept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 27‒49.
55 Cullen: The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict, p. 37.
56 Katherine Draper describes how “the French government employed an impressive
variety of creative legal semantics to avoid officially recognizing the conflict as a
“war.”” Draper, Katherine: Why a War Without a Name May Need One: Policy-
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though it had to deploy substantial military forces against the Front de
Libération Nationale.57
This consistent practice of non-recognition of the existence of an armed
conflict in colonial wars has effectively recreated the former — allegedly
abolished differentiation concerning conflicts between civilised and non-
civilised people. Yet, it must be admitted that the newly independent for-
mer colonies were quite glad to maintain the dichotomy between interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts and certainly not too eager to
extend the protection of international humanitarian law to insurgents fight-
ing against their rule.
By the 1990s the conventional framework of international humanitarian
law only gave a skeletal regulation of non-international armed conflicts58
and the existence of any customary rules pertaining to the regulation of
means and methods of warfare beyond the scope of treaty provisions was
generally denied.59 In 1995, however, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued a ground-breaking judgment
which stated that there exists a wide range of customary norms applicable
to non-international armed conflicts and defined the scope of application
Based Application of International Humanitarian Law in the Algerian War, in:
Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 48, 2013, No. 3, pp. 575‒602, here p. 585.
However, in 1956 the French Prime Minister accepted an offer by the International
Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisoners “in conformity with Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions regarding armed conflicts not of an international character”
and thus implicitly accepted that the conflict amounted to a non-international
armed conflict. See Flory, Maurice: Algérie et Droit International, in: Annuaire
Français de Droit International, Vol. 5, 1959, pp. 817‒844, here p. 831.
57 See more in detail Greenberg, Eldon van Cleef: Law and the Conduct of the Alge-
rian Revolution, in: Harvard Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, 1970, pp. 37‒
72.
58 Greenwood, Christopher: Development of International Humanitarian Law by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in: Max Planck Year-
book of United Nations Law, Vol. 2, 1998, pp. 97‒140, here p. 128.
59 See e.g. Farer, Thomas: Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the
Definition of “International Armed Conflict”, in: Columbia Law Review, Vol. 71,
1971, pp. 37‒72., here p. 40; Bond, James E.: Application of the Law of War to
Internal Conflicts, in: Georgia Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 1973, pp. 345‒
384; Eitel, Tono: Lebanon – A Legal Survey, in: (1986) 29 German Yearbook of
International Law, Vol. 29, 1986, pp. 11‒55, here p. 19. But see Fischer, Horst:
Limitation and Prohibition of the Use of Certain Weapons in Non-International
Armed Conflicts, in: Yearbook of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law,
1989, pp. 117‒180.
Three Sketches on the Universality of International Humanitarian Law
251
of these rights. In the Tadić jurisdiction case the Appeals Chamber sub-
mitted that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is […] protracted ar-
med violence between governmental authorities and organised armed
groups or between such groups within a State”.60 This definition has gene-
rally been accepted as a restatement of customary international law, con-
sistently reiterated by the ICTY,61 the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda,62 the International Criminal Court,63 internationalised criminal
courts,64 military law manuals65 and international expert reports.66 The cu-
60 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals
Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995) [70].
61 See inter alia Prosecutor v Delalić et al. (Judgement) (International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, Case No IT-96-21-T, 16
November 1998) [183]; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgement) (Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No
IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001) [24]; Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Judgement)
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber,
Case No IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002) [56]; Prosecutor v. Milutinović
et al (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Tri-
al Chamber I, Case No IT-05-87-T, 26 February 2009) [125]; Prosecutor v. Gotov-
ina et al (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Trial Chamber I, Case No IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011) [1674].
62 Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Trial Chamber I, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998) [619]; Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial
Chamber I, Case No ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999) [92].
63 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (International
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007)
[233].
64 Prosecutor v. Eav (Judgement) (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambo-
dia, Trial Chamber, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010) (‘Eav Tri-
al’) [412].
65 UK Ministry of Defence: Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004, p. 29.; Dinstein, Yoram/Garraway, Charles H.B./Schmitt,
Michael N. (eds.) The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict
with Commentary, San Remo: San Remo Institute of International Humanitarian
Law, 2006, p. 2.
66 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Sec-
retary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September
2004, UN Doc. S/2005/60 (25 January 2005) [74]; Commission of Inquiry on
Lebanon, Report pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1, UN Doc.
A/HRC/3/2 (23 November 2006) [51]; International Commission of Inquiry, Re-
Tamás Hoffmann
252
stomary status of the Tadić definition is also buttressed by its inclusion in
Article 8 (2) (f) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.67
While this decision arguably amounted to judicial law-making, today it
is generally accepted that the majority of the norms applicable to interna-
tional armed conflicts now also extend to non-international armed con-
flicts.68 Judge Cassese summarized this phenomenon the following way:
[T]here has been a convergence of two bodies of international law with the
result that internal strife is now governed to a large extent by the rules and
principles which had traditionally only applied to international conflicts. […]
regarding the formation of customary international law rules to protect those
who are not taking part in hostilities, […] this convergence has come about
due largely to the following factors: (1) the increase in the number of civil
conflicts; (2) the increase in the level of cruelty of internal conflicts; (3) the
increasing interdependence of States; (4) the influence of universal human
rights standards. The Appeals Chamber then turned to the extension of the ru-
les regarding methods and means of warfare to internal armed conflicts and
concluded that a similar blurring had occurred. In short, certain norms apply
as customary international law to internal and international conflicts alike.69
This remarkable transformation of international humanitarian law is aptly
demonstrated by the Customary Law Study of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC).70 The ICRC Study attempts to authoritatively
identify the customary norms of humanitarian law and found that most ru-
les of international humanitarian law are now equally applicable in inter-
port on Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, A/HRC/17/44 (1 June 2011) [63].
67 Article 8 (2) (f) provides that ”Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an
international character [...] that take place in the territory of a State when there is
protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, opened for signature 17 July 1988, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 Ju-
ly 2002).
68 See more in detail Hoffmann, Tamás: The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian
Law – Antonio Cassese and the Creation of the Customary Law of Non-interna-
tional Armed Conflict, in: Stahn, Carsten/Herik, Larissa van den (eds): Future Per-
spectives on International Criminal Justice, The Hague: TMC Asser, 2010, pp. 58‒
80.
69 United Nations Memorandum from President Cassese to Members of the Prepara-
tory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on the
Definition of War Crimes and General Principles of Criminal Law as Reflected in
the International Tribunal’s Jurisprudence, 22 March 1996, paragraph 11.
70 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie/Doswald-Beck, Louise (eds.): Customary International
Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, Vol. I‒II.
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national and non-international armed conflicts alike.71 Still, even though
there have been suggestions for eliminating this dichotomy,72 a complete
unification of the two fields seems to be unrealistic. Some rules pertaining
to international conflict would be ill-fit to a non-international armed con-
flict. It is obvious that the rules of occupation cannot be completely ap-
plied to civil wars as the regulation of occupation is based on the notion of
temporary administration of a territory without the infringements of sover-
eign rights. It is difficult to imagine how that could be applied in its entire-
ty to an internal conflict, for instance the injunctions against changing
existing laws or the dismissal of members of the public administration.
Still, some countries have effectively abolished the distinction between
different legal regimes on the ground. For instance, the armed forces of
the United States73 and Germany74 apply the rules of international huma-
nitarian law irrespective of the type of conflict. Similarly, the Canadian
Armed Forces apply in such manner the “spirit and principles” of humani-
tarian law.75 Yet, while this regulation reflects policy considerations to en-
sure the respect of international humanitarian law to the fullest possible
extent, these countries still maintain the traditional dichotomy with regard
71 The Study heavily draws on the jurisprudence of international criminal fora and
refers to ICTY case-law and the Statute of the International Criminal Court over
170 times. See Cryer, Robert: Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The
Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law
Study, in: Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 11, 2006, pp. 239‒263, here p.
240.
72 See e.g. Crawford, Emily: Unequal Before the Law: The Case for the Elimination
of the Distinction Between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts,
in: Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, 2007, pp. 441‒465.
73 DoD Law of War Program, Department of Defense, Directive Number 2311.01E
paragraph 4.1, 9 May 2006. “Members of the DoD Components comply with the
law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized,
and in all other military operations.”.
74 Fleck, Dieter (ed.) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999, pp. 48‒49.
75 See Canadian Forces Doctrine Manual: The Law of Armed Conflict at the Opera-
tional and Tactical Level B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 17-1, paragraph 1702 (13 August
2001) available at http://www.fichl.org/uploads/media/Canadian_LOAC_Manual_
2001_English.pdf (last accessed: 12 January 2015). “[T]oday a significant number
of armed conflicts in which the CF may be involved are non-international in na-
ture. As stated, the law applicable to such conflicts is limited. It is CF policy, how-
ever, that the CF will, as a minimum, apply the spirit and principles of the LOAC
during all operations other than domestic operations.”.
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to the determination of combatant status, clearly rejecting to grant comba-
tant immunity to insurgents.
Universal Application of International Humanitarian Law as an Abuse –
Equal Application of Law in Asymmetric Conflicts
Before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, states usually denied
the applicability of international humanitarian law to the fight against ter-
rorism.76 Terrorism was generally dealt within the framework of criminal
regulation. Still, it seems that the unprecedented magnitude of the 11 Sep-
tember terrorist acts has fundamentally changed the legal framework con-
cerning this issue. President George W. Bush made an oral “declaration of
war” on Al Qaeda77 and according to the official American doctrine even
though the worldwide hostilities with the terrorist group were regulated by
jus in bello, the persons participating in terrorist organisations could not
enjoy the protection of the Geneva Conventions.78
The US Department of Defense evaluated the situation as follows:
The current conflict is not an international war between Nation States, but
rather a conflict between a Nation State and a non-governmental organisation.
At the same time, the current conflict is not a civil war under Article 3, becau-
se it is a conflict of “an international character” rather than an internal armed
conflict between parties contending for control over a government or a territo-
ry.79
76 In ratifying 1977 Geneva Protocol I in 1998, the United Kingdom made a State-
ment that the term “armed conflict” denotes “a situation which is not constituted
by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concert-
ed or in isolation.” See www.icrc.org (last accessed: 10 January 2015). Still, the
UK Government eventually accepted to apply certain international legal standards,
even some from the main body of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Roberts,
Adam: The Laws of War in the War on Terror, in: Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights, Vol. 33, 2003, pp. 193‒246, here p. 204.
77 Avril McDonald, ‘Declarations of War and Belligerent Parties: International Law
Governing Hostilities Between States and Transnational Terrorist Networks’,
Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 54, 2007, pp. 279‒314.
78 Memorandum, President of the United States, to Vice President, et al., subject:
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, 7 February 2002.
79 Memorandum for William J. Haynes II., General Counsel, Department of Defense
from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Robert J. Delabunty, Spe-
cial Counsel, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban de-
tainees, 9 January 2002. Somewhat similarly the Israeli High Court of Justice ex-
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This global war on terror represents a completely new approach to tack-
ling the problem of terrorism by extending the material scope of applica-
tion of international humanitarian law.80 Even though the existence of
a “state of war” could have significance under US domestic law, potential-
ly explaining such categorisation by the US leadership,81 the use of legal
semantics82 was an opportunistic attempt to exploit the normative frame-
work of the law of war. In contrast to earlier fears that the recognition of
the existence of a non-international armed conflict could confer status to
non-state armed groups, the US administration realised that the norms of
armed conflicts — especially those concerning the conduct of hostilities
— in an asymmetric conflict inevitably favour the state that possesses a
more organised armed force and more advanced technology.83
plained that “In today’s reality, a terrorist organization is likely to have consider-
able military capabilities. At times they have military capabilities that exceed
those of states. Confrontation with those dangers cannot be restricted within the
state and its penal law. Confronting the dangers of terrorism constitutes a part of
the international law dealing with armed conflicts of international character.” HCJ
769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Is-
rael (2006), English translation: http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/
a34/02007690.a34.pdf (last accessed 18 January 2015) paragraph 21.
80 Since 2010, the Obama administration does not speak about global war on terror
but armed conflict against al-Qaeda, Taliban and associated forces. But beyond se-
mantics there is no actual change in US policy as the American government fol-
lows the global battlefield approach of the Bush administration. See Sterio, Meli-
na: The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror: The (Il)legality of Tar-
geted Killings under International Law, in: Case Western Reserve Journal of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 45, 2012, pp. 197-214, here pp. 201‒202.
81 Jinks points out that the categorisation of fight against terrorism as “war” could
have significant domestic legal consequences such as the possibility in the United
States for the President to assert extraordinary war powers. However, this fact can-
not in any way influence the applicability of the regulatory framework of interna-
tional humanitarian law. Jinks, Derek: The Applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tions to the “Global War on Terror”, Vanderbilt Journal of International Law, Vol.
46, 2005‒2006, p. 170.
82 Mégret, Frédéric: ‘War’? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, in: Euro-
pean Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, 2002, pp. 361‒400.
83 The US government’s legal assessment obviously also directed the decision of the
US Supreme Court in the Hamdan case, which seemed to pronounce that the con-
flict in Afghanistan was of a non-international character. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.
pdf (last accessed: 14 November 2014), p. 67. However, Milanovic rightly points
out that it is also possible to read the Hamdan decision as a recognition of the sta-
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In such a situation the recognition of a non-international armed conflict
and the concomitant use of international humanitarian law actually has
much more severe repercussions for members of a non-state armed group
than designating them as criminal and allow human rights law to create li-
mitations for the use of violence. As Dinstein emphasises “in a civil war
there is always the built-in distinction between combatants who fight for
the central (constitutionally legal) Government and those who rise against
it. The latter are viewed as traitors […]”.84 Consequently, members of
non-state armed groups do not enjoy combatant privileges even if they ful-
ly comply with the rules of international humanitarian law and can be pro-
secuted for mere participation in an armed conflict. On the other hand,
they can be targeted (so state forces do not have the obligation to arrest
them)85 and upon capture possibly detained for an undefined period of
time with limited judicial oversight.86
This is how the dream of universal application of international humani-
tarian law has grotesquely been fulfilled: We (the states) now acknow-
tus of Common Article 3 as customary law in all armed conflicts, regardless of the
qualification of the situation at hand. Milanovic, Marko: Lessons for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror: Comparing Hamdan and the
Israeli Targeted Killings Case, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89,
2007, No. 866, pp. 373‒393, here p. 377.
84 Dinstein, Yoram: The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian
Law, in: Von Heinegg, Wolff Heintschel/Epping, Volker (eds.): International Hu-
manitarian Law Facing New Challenges, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 145‒
156, here pp. 149‒150.
85 There is actually a debate in the legal literature as to the extent to which members
of non-state armed groups can be targeted outside the context of actual fighting.
The International Committee of the Red Cross proposed a “functional membership
approach”, meaning that in the absence of an affirmative disengagement members
of organised armed groups should be regarded as taking direct part in hostilities,
while at the same time unorganised civilians should only be deemed to have lost
their civilian immunity and therefore seen as fighters when they are specifically
engaged in acts of hostilities. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Inter-
pretative Guideline on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities in Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct
-participation-ihl-article-020609/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-ICRC.p
df (last accessed: 18 January 2015) See more in detail Melzer, Nils: Targeted
Killing in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 324‒350.
86 For a thorough perusal of the literature see e.g. Aughey, Sean/Sári, Aurél: Target-
ing and Detention in NonInternational Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the
Limits of Human Rights Convergence, in: International Law Studies, Vol. 91,
2015, pp. 60‒118.
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ledge that you (terrorist/savage etc.) are fighting an armed conflict with us,
so give up everything that defended you (such as the lack of distinction
from the civilian population) and prepare to die in a fair fight (for instance
in a drone strike launched by an operator from another continent)! The ul-
timate irony is that the progressive jurisprudence of the international cri-
minal fora behind the “humanization” of humanitarian law was guided by
a belief that expanding the scope of application of the law of armed con-
flict will result in ever greater protection. However, the judges seemed to
have forgotten that the expansion of international humanitarian law, who-
se rules were created by a desire to balance military necessity with con-
cerns for humanity, could “crowd out” human rights law, which on the
other hand is focusing on the protection of the individual against the sta-
te.87 And this is how the promise of protection has become the promise of
destruction…
Conclusion – The Promise of International Humanitarian Law
The law of war was originally not created to realise humanitarian aspira-
tions. Even though Lauterpacht forcefully argued that “its purpose is al-
most entirely humanitarian in the literal sense of the word, namely to
prevent or mitigate suffering and, in some cases, to rescue life from the
savagery of battle and passion”,88 Jochnick and Normand convincingly
contend that the codification of jus in bello was in many respects original-
ly primarily a recognition of systemic factors existing independently of le-
gal regulation.89 Humanity in war originally referred to the need to use
87 Hoffmann: The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian Law, p. 78.
88 Lauterpacht, Hersch: The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, in: British
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 29, 1952, pp. 360‒382, here pp. 363‒364.
89 “War has long been limited largely by factors independent of law. For complex
military, political, and economic reasons, belligerents tend to use the minimal
force necessary to achieve their political objectives. Force that goes beyond that
— gratuitous violence — wastes resources, provokes retaliation, invites moral
condemnation, and impedes post-war relations with the enemy nation.” Jochnick,
Chris/Normand, Roger: The Legitimation of Violence: Critical History of the
Laws of War, in: Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 35, 1994, pp. 49‒95,
here pp. 53‒54.
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any necessary means to reduce the period of fighting.90 This explains how
the German Imperial Chancellor could address the Reichstag in March
1916 with the following words:
Every means that is calculated to shorten the war constitutes the most humane
policy to follow. When the most ruthless measures are considered best calcu-
lated to lead us to victory, and a swift victory […] they must be employed.91
Today, however, international humanitarian law is no longer dependent on
reciprocity, the si omnes (general application) clauses no longer vitiate the
application of humanitarian treaties and the rules concerning the protec-
tion of the victims of war are characterised by strict, non-derogable prohi-
bitions. Yet, the regulation of the conduct of hostilities, such as targeting
rules employing vaguely worded principles still creates a playing field
which enables powerful states to use the normative framework to their
own advantage and could hardly deserve to be called humanitarian.92
From a sociological point of view, this is exacerbated by the fact that due
to the complex and technical regulatory framework of international huma-
nitarian law general international lawyers usually tended to neglect this
field. O’Donoghue explains that:
This specialisation is in part driven by the dominance of certain forms of legal
expertise, in particular, the military and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). The military, for obvious reasons, has a particular per-
spective and focus on IHL and further, has the resources necessary to com-
mand a complete understanding of all its rules. Similarly, the ICRC, with its
competence driven by IHL treaty law, maintains a complete expertise. While
military and ICRC opinion may not always correlate, their knowledge and
competence, which extends to understanding all the rules of IHL, makes it
90 The celebrated Lieber Code, for instance, pronounced in paragraph 15 that “the
more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are
brief.” General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, Official Records, US War Depart-
ment, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1899, Series III, Vol. 3, pp. 148‒164, here p. 152.
91 Cited in Garner, James Wilford: Studies in Government and International Law,
Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1943, p. 271.
92 Solis aptly points out that “[A] few scholars argue that both “law of war” and “law
of armed conflict”, are passé terms, replaced in the eyes of some internationalists
by “international humanitarian law”, passing over the irony how a body of law
defining how noncombatants may lawfully be killed (i.e., collateral damage) is
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difficult for those outside this realm to compete without being dismissed as
ignorant of the entirety of the law and therefore not competent to comment.93
Nevertheless, international humanitarian law is not beyond redemption.
The general principles that until today served as a means to further state
interest can become a site for contestation and used to restrict violence in
armed conflict.94 If general international lawyers discover international
humanitarian law and start to challenge old orthodoxies, maybe the old
dream of equal protection in warfare will finally come to fruition.
93 O’Donoghue, Aoife: Splendid Isolation: International Humanitarian Law, Legal
Theory and the International Legal Order, in: Yearbook of International Humani-
tarian Law, Vol. 14, 2011, pp. 107‒131, here p. 109.
94 For a recent doctrinal attempt to interpret international humanitarian law as re-
stricting the right to freely target combatants see Goodman, Ryan: The Power to
Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, in: European Journal of International Law,
Vol. 24, 2013, No. 3, pp. 819‒853.
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